Developing a Fuzzy Expert System to Examine Hazard Analysis in The United States Army by Karels, Charles J.
DEVELOPING A FUZZY EXPERT SYSTEM 
TO EXAMINE HAZARD ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES ARNP 
M S.'. -~~ys : 
iiiiiiiiimniiiuMHUiiuiuHim 
Columbus State University 
TSYS School of Computer Science 
The Graduate Program in Applied Computer Science 
Developing a Fuzzy Expert System 
to Examine Hazard Analysis in The United States Army 
A Thesis in 
Applied Computer Science 
By 
Charles J. Karels 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Science 
April 2015 
■MUUIBlllHHII! 
^^ imi———"■"—"" ■ ■ " "«"^^"^^^^^Mi—i 
11 
I have submitted this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of 
Science 
Date Charles J. Karels 
We approve the thesis of Charles J. Karels as presented here. 
Date Rania Hodhod, Assistant Professor 
of Computer Science, Thesis Advisor 
-V f A °f* 
Date Angkul Kongmunvattana, 
Associate Professor of Computer Science 
Date LTC Micheal Ferret, Professor of 
Military Science 
Date Shamim Khan, 
Professor of Computer Science 
Date Radhouane Chouchane, 
Associate Professor of Computer Science 
^/V:2^// f 
Date Wayne Summers, Department Chair 
TSYS School of Computer Science 
Ill 
Contents 
Abstract iv 
Table of Figures v 
List of Tables vi 
Declaration vii 
1. Introduction 1 
1.2 The Risk Management (RM) Process 2 
1.3 Organization 4 
2. Related Works 5 
3. Methodology 12 
3.1 Research Goal 12 
3.2 Scenario Selection 13 
3.2.1 Foot March Scenario 14 
3.2.2 Maintenance Scenario 15 
3.3 Recruitment Strategy 16 
3.4 Database Creation 18 
3.5 Coding 20 
3.6 Hazard Value Assignment 21 
3.7 Fuzzy Expert System 24 
3.7.7 Rule Development 27 
3.8 Data Evaluation 28 
4. Results 30 
4.1 Foot March Scenario Results 31 
4.2 Maintenance Scenario Results 36 
5. Analysis 38 
6. Conclusion 42 
6.1 Limitations 43 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work 43 
Works Cited 46 
sm 
IV 
Abstract 
The research conducted in this thesis is an attempt to determine if there are any 
biographical similarities between second lieutenants in the US Army who view risk in a 
similar manner and if so, which are the most significant. A study was conducted using in- 
group surveys of 72 second lieutenants receiving training in Infantry Basic Officer 
Leader Course (IBOLC). The participants were provided with two written surveys each 
presenting a scenario based on military activities. They were asked to evaluate the 
scenarios and fill out Risk Management (RM) worksheets based on the US Army's 
doctrinal process for conducting RM. The RM worksheets were then evaluated based on 
the hazards they identified for each hazard category. A fuzzy expert system was 
developed to evaluate the lieutenants' performance in assessing the different hazards. The 
output results were then evaluated using the two-step cluster process and one way 
ANOVA test in SPSS. The cluster results showed Platoon and Major as the two most 
significant predictors for cluster formation on the Foot March scenario. Of the two only 
Platoon demonstrated statistical significance on the ANOVA. Prior Service and Platoon 
were the two most significant predictors for cluster formation on the Maintenance 
scenario but neither showed statistical significance. 
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1. Introduction 
Accidental and combat related death and injuries cause significant loss to US 
Army combat power every year. Additionally, losses of material and time run the dollar 
figures for such damages into the hundreds of millions. Risk Management (RM) is the 
process that the United States Army uses to identify and assess hazards, and to mitigate 
identified risks associated with military activities, both on and off duty. 
RM decisions are often based on the experience, prior training, and intuitive 
assessments of leaders and their staffs [1]. This type of assessment leads to highly 
qualitative decision making that can be difficult to quantify into a structured process. The 
Army's RM process attempts to address this challenge by providing a format for leaders 
to follow that is not so restrictive as to limit initiative or creativity but structured enough 
to provide some uniformity to risk assessments. 
In 1978, the Army changed the name of the US Army Agency for Aviation Safety 
to the US Army Safety Center and expanded its role to include responsibility for both 
aviation and ground safety. On January 31, 2005 the Safety Center was re-christened the 
US Army Combat Readiness Center (USACRC) and given "the expanded mission to 
become the center of gravity for all loss-related areas" [2]. The USACRC focuses on 
development of tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP) and process implementation to 
improve safety across the force. 
The highly qualitative nature of the Army's RM process provides an opportunity 
to study how leaders assess hazards and determine risk. According to the literature 
reviewed for this research, a study of this type has not taken place. The proposed study 
should provide valuable feedback for the Army training community by identifying traits 
and commonalities in hazard identification and risk determination among leadership 
populations. These commonalities can be used to inform RM training processes for these 
populations to maximize its effectiveness. 
1.2 The Risk Management (RM) Process 
The multi-phase RM process consists of five steps: 
Step 1 - Identify the Hazards - A hazard is defined as "a condition with the potential to 
cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; 
or mission degradation" [1]. The goal of Step 1 is to identify all of the hazards that exist 
in an operation in order to be able to assess them. 
Step 2- Assess the Hazards - This step focuses on quantifying the likelihood and 
severity of the hazards identified in Step 1. In this step the level of "initial risk" is 
determined for each hazard. FM 5-19 states that "Technical competency, operational 
experience, and lessons-learned weigh higher than any set of alpha-numeric codes. 
Mathematics and matrixes are not a substitute for sound judgment" [1]. 
This step in the process forms the basis for this research. 
Step 3 - Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions - The third step consists of 
developing a control for each identified hazard that includes information on what, when, 
where, why, and how the control measure will be implemented, and who will supervise it. 
Residual  risk   is  the  risk  remaining  for  a  hazard  after  the  control   measure  are 
implemented. The overall level of risk for the operation is then determined. According to 
doctrine it must be determined to be at least as high as the highest remaining level of risk. 
Risk decisions are made at this point in the process. The level of decision making 
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authority is based on the level of overall risk that is determined. The decision making 
authority may approve, disapprove, or return the document for further evaluation. 
Step 4 - Implement Controls - The control measures identified in the previous steps are 
integrated into the plan for the operation and are implemented by the appropriate 
individual or group to ensure that they are effective and remain in place. 
Step 5 - Supervise and Evaluate - During this step the controls are evaluated to 
determine their effectiveness at mitigating the hazards that were identified. This step also 
includes a feedback loop to input improvements and refinements to the process for 
further use. 
The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is a multi-step process that is 
used when evaluating a situation or planning an operation. The process is designed to be 
implemented by an individual leader or a commander's staff. It allows them to provide a 
well-rounded and thoroughly thought out product for the commander's approval. There 
are other, more succinct versions of the MDMP that streamline some of the steps and are 
more efficient for use by lower level units or when time is a limiting factor. 
The steps of the RM process are integrated into the planning cycle and MDMP in 
order to make determinations of risk level and, by accurately identifying hazards and 
risks, implement controls to mitigate them. The integration of RM into the MDMP takes 
place at all echelons of military planning. Hazard Analysis and Risk Determination are 
critical parts of the RM process because they determine the level of initial risk that the 
commanders or planners will assign to the operation. This research will focus on Step 2 - 
Assess hazards to determine risks. 
The research was conducted as an in-group study based on the survey results 
collected from the participants. The participants consisted of second lieutenants attending 
the Infantry Basic Officer Leaders Course (IBOLC) at Ft. Benning, Georgia. The survey 
consisted of two military scenarios on which they conducted a risk assessment using the 
Army's doctrinal RM process. The hazards identified were evaluated with a rule based 
fuzzy expert system implemented in MATLAB and then evaluated for similarities and 
significance using the SPSS statistical analysis tool. 
1.3 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows; the next chapter is the related works section 
covering RM as it relates to this study. Chapter 3 is research methodology and discusses 
how the research was initiated and conducted. The results of the research are covered in 
Chapter 4 and are analyzed in Chapter 5. The conclusion is Chapter 6 and contains the 
identified limitations of the study and recommendations for future work. 
2. Related Works 
The US Army has numerous Field Manuals (FM), Pamphlets (PAM), Army 
Regulations (AR), and Army Technical Publications (ATP) that address RM, but 
literature and study beyond these is very narrow in scope. Most published literature 
related to military operations falls into two categories, process description and analysis of 
individual events but not on Risk Management (RM) in the United States Army. 
The United States Army Combat Readiness Center (USACRC) [2] publishes a 
monthly magazine called Knowledge. The magazine discusses many aspects of safety 
and often focuses on specific incidents as a means to discuss safety topics but they are 
focused on singular themes rather than generalizations across the force. Examples of 
topics from a recent issues include the dangers of drinking and driving, and the hazards 
associated with failure to properly chock a vehicle while it is in maintenance. The 
magazine generally focuses on the aftermath of accidents rather than on predictive 
analysis and trends in planning. 
In [3] the author provides a description and overview of RM in the US Army but 
does little more than expand on the process described in ATP 5-19, Risk Management. 
The authors of [4] discuss a risk management process based on an amalgamation of 
techniques developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Sweden. They conduct an overview of the different 
methods and develop a framework of what they consider the essential elements of a 
quality RM process. Their evaluation of this framework is very narrowly focused on two 
aspects of military operations, intelligence and legal assessments. They do an effective 
review of the processes but they are process focused and do not conduct any evaluation 
of the individuals performing the assessments. 
RM as a decision making tool is significant to the Army and military operations. 
The goal of RM in the Army is to use the process to structure an inherently unstructured 
domain. By integrating RM into the MDMP at each stage of the process it presents a 
much more structured and orderly system with the goal of producing repeatable results. 
This formalized structuring of the RM allows it to be used as an effective decision 
support tool by providing commanders and leaders with quantitative outputs that can be 
more easily evaluated. Research conducted in [5] discusses the significance of RM as a 
decision support tool for military leaders and the significance of modeling risk situations 
as a part of the tool. [6] discusses the use of quantitative risk assessments and their 
adoption by various military and government organizations. In [7] the author describes an 
outline of the risk decision making process. Within her model she develops the steps, and 
outlines the sub-processes used in each. Each of these works do a credible job of 
describing RM as a process and its importance in an operational setting but do not make 
an attempt to examine the individuals or groups that are working on the process. 
Some interesting discussion on the planning aspects of risk management comes 
from civilian sectors. A study conducted on the German insurance sector found that: 
''While all firms allege to deal with operational risk consciously in general, only 60 per 
cent of them follow a structured and formally defined risk management process. Out of 
the remaining 40 per cent, most respondents indicated that operational risk is managed 
rather implicitly, i.e. without explicit formalization" [8]. Even though the type of risk in 
this study is different from the risk evaluated in most Army situations, the fact that so 
many firms in a risk centric sector (insurance) fail to utilize a formalized risk 
management process is surprising. Many accident reviews from military operations 
(another risk centric sector) identify failure in planning as the proximate cause to the 
accident. 
The insurance sector has made attempts to integrate expert systems into the RM 
process. In [9], the authors use a neural network as a decision support tool to data mine 
company records to determine potentially fraudulent cases. The researchers point out a 
problem with some data mining tools is that they do not provide a tool that is easy for 
managers to understand or explain. The neural network used in this study has the 
limitation of low tolerance for missing data and during the study the researchers were 
forced to exclude records that were not complete. While this type of investigation could 
be useful to military RM practitioners for information gathering it still does not make an 
attempt to get in front of the problem by reviewing risk in a pre-event time period. 
Forecasting risk is an integral part of many business operations and begins to take 
a proactive look at RM. In [10] a neural network is utilized to research risk management 
focused on sales forecasting. This study has many of the same limitations as [9] since the 
system is not tolerant of missing or incomplete data sets. The study does provide another 
reference point since it is proactively focused and uses correlations in existing data to 
predict future outcomes. 
Work done in [11] provides a practical, proactive approach to RM by using a 
fuzzy expert system to forecast supply chain risk based on a number of factors within a 
company. Their method provides a feasible representation of the Army's RM process 
since it takes many different qualitative and quantitative factors into account. Their 
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system uses fuzzy logic and the example is implemented using MATLAB. Their system 
is tolerant of missing records and allows the use of natural language instead of requiring 
all inputs as crisp numbers. Even though these sources focus on the prediction of risk, 
neither of them look at the human factors involved or take individual risk perception into 
account. 
In [12] the researchers examine IT risk using a fuzzy-neural expert system. Their 
study is another example that closely represents the Army's process of RM. Their 
introduction has a number of statements that almost mirror the verbiage in ATP 5-19. 
Their description of risk and comment that "Risk calculation is never definite regardless 
of the method used", indicate that the research may have implication in the current study. 
From a theoretical standpoint, game theory is often used when approaching RM 
modeling. Game theory is used in varying degrees to demonstrate risk in sectors as 
diverse as international business relations [13], and solid waste management [14]. As a 
theoretical model the research done in [13] and [14] provides an interesting structure to 
RM but it does not address the practical matter of individual input into the process. 
Military RM falls more closely into the structures of Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) and Traditional Risk Management (TRM). In [15] ERM and TRM are discussed 
and differentiated based on their structure and characteristics. The author delineates 
between them by discussing TRM as reactive and ERM as proactive. Based on this 
description the Army has sought to incorporate an ERM style approach by viewing 
hazards and risk not just as individual incidents to be reviewed but as a continuous 
process with each phase as an input into the next. With this continuous process risks and 
hazards are sought out and addressed proactively in all parts of an operation, from 
planning to after action review. 
In the field of ERM, it has been found that there is a positive association between 
objective setting and risk identification [16]. This means that for firms that set clear 
objectives and identified the risks associated with them it was "easier to create an 
inventory of risks and for individual business units to implement the tools to evaluate and 
monitor these risks." This concept is very similar to the Army's goal to achieve 
integration of RM into all levels of the MDMP [1]. By integrating RM into all levels of 
the decision making process commanders and their staffs optimally consider RM as it 
relates to each objective of the operation thus ensuring that the tools to evaluate risks and 
monitor them are in place. 
Other ERM models are discussed in [17] where the author develops a four 
pillared approach to ERM based on a survey of Nordic companies and how they approach 
the process, [18] use of a system dynamics approach to ERM, and [19] using enterprise 
resource planning solutions. The wide range of research and model descriptions indicates 
the significance of RM across the spectrum of private and public organizations. RM 
discussion is mainly focused on the highest risk sectors that have the widest array of 
hazard inputs like credit, finance, and insurance. Military operations meet this definition 
also but are not routinely studied in scholarly works. 
Individual risk perception is discussed in [20]. The researchers explored how 
individuals perceive new risks and the bias that they apply when comparing the hazard 
posed to themselves versus others or when the risk is not well defined. This research has 
some implications in the current study since it provides a look at risk perception from 
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various individuals and how they view hazards. When completing a risk assessment for a 
military operation, if an individual feels that a hazard is not as significant simply because 
of a bias obtained by having heard about or being more aware of the hazard, they may 
incorrectly reduce the level of severity that they attribute to the hazard. 
In [21] the researchers conducted a study to determine how risk can be perceived 
based on how the risk is framed. They determined that there is a difference between the 
level of risk that a person is likely to accept based on how the problem is framed, either 
positively or negatively. An older but informative study on the influence of risk in 
decision making is [22]. In this study the researchers discuss an isolation effect that 
caused study participants to make "inconsistent preferences when the same choice was 
presented in different forms" [22]. This research also has implications on military RM, 
especially when RM is being used as a decision support tool. This study indicates that 
how a hazard or risk is perceived or presented could have bearing on the level of risk out 
of proportion with the actual hazard or risk itself. 
Considerable research has been conducted on individual risk propensity based on 
personality characteristics. One study of note is [23] where the authors discuss the 
significance of understanding the risk behavior of the members of an organization. They 
state "In organizational terms, a better understanding of risk behaviour could contribute 
significantly to risk management programmes" [23]. The authors also differentiate 
categories of risk takers between risk seeking and risk bearing. Risk seekers seek out 
situations that they perceive as hazardous for stimulation, either seeking challenge or fun. 
People in the risk bearing category are the goal achievers and risk adaptors. These groups 
do not seek out risk but are able to cope with it and manage risk in a way to achieve the 
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desired results. This research will seek to identify linkages in the second category since 
most Army leaders should cluster in the risk bearing category for risk evaluation in their 
professional pursuits. Risk seekers may form as outliers to the overall group. 
Personality influence on risk taking and acceptance is discussed in [24], and [25]. 
These studies evaluate a variety of biographical and experiential characteristics to 
determine which have the most significant impact on an individual's perception and risk 
tolerance. The research conducted in [25] is more focused on "risky" behavior like 
smoking and or occupational choice; this group might more closely resemble the risk 
takers from [23]. The results from [24] discuss risk bearing attitudes from the perspective 
that is more closely aligned with the risk bearing groups from [23]. Both of these studies 
are looking for associations between people who view or partake of risk in a similar 
fashion or at a similar level. These are similar directions to what this thesis is seeking. 
Literature and research using expert systems in risk management is limited. The 
majority of the research in the field that uses expert systems focuses on data mining 
utilizing neural networks. Fuzzy systems are used in only a small number of research 
projects and none of this research has been conducted in the domain of military 
operations. The field of individual risk perception holds some implications for this 
research by providing some starting points for review when evaluating response clusters. 
Using a fuzzy expert system to view RM proactively as it relates to the human factors of 
Army leaders should provide useful information for the Army training system, and new 
research in the field. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Goal 
This study is being conducted in an attempt to answer the question "Are there 
similarities within populations of leaders in the United States Army in terms of how they 
evaluate hazards? If yes, which are the most significant". One challenge with military 
operations is that they contain so many situations that are difficult to quantify and must 
therefore be addressed by the experience and intuition of the leader assessing the 
situation [1]. Leaders in the Army are trained to assess threats and work on ways to 
mitigate them. 
In the case of RM, the challenge of identifying hazards and mitigating them is 
exacerbated by the fact that most hazards cannot be engaged or destroyed but must be 
addressed or mitigated in order for an operation to continue. If similarities can be 
identified among leaders who assess hazards similarly, then these associations can be 
used to identify potential training opportunities for feedback to the training cycle in order 
to provide a greater commonality in hazard assessment throughout the studied population. 
This research uses artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to determine how a 
population of leaders in the U.S. Army assesses hazards. The study was conducted by 
analyzing the results of RM worksheets collected from survey participants, analyzing 
them with a fuzzy expert system and then using clustering techniques to identify 
relationships between participants who identify hazards in a similar manner. A sample 
RM worksheet is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Sample Army Risk Management Worksheet [26] 
3.2 Scenario Selection 
The scenarios designed for this research are based on discussion with the 
Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Safety Office on Ft. Benning, GA. The Safety 
Office staff identified planning and execution of tactical and non-tactical foot marches as 
one of the most casualty producing training events conducted on the installation. For this 
reason, a practical exercise that requires conducting RM on a Foot March scenario is the 
capstone event used for evaluation of students attending the Additional Duty Safety 
Officer (ADSO) course that is conducted quarterly by the MCoE Safely Office. The 
second scenario was developed with a maintenance and vehicle focus in a cold weather 
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environment in order to differentiate the types of hazards that the respondents would have 
to react to. The scenarios were created based on the researcher's experience, conference 
with other US Army officers and Non Commissioned Officers and are based on Army 
doctrinal references including [1], [27], [28], and [29]. The scenarios used for this study 
are provided below. 
3.2.1 Foot March Scenario 
Scenario:  Conduct a Tactical Foot March for Training 
SITUATION: Your BN is preparing to assume ready cycle for your BDE and your PLT has been 
telephonically alerted to report to work as part of an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) 
intended to validate your readiness to alert, assemble, and execute PLT Critical Tasks. While your PSG is 
preparing the PLT for movement and overseeing PCCs/PCIs, you report to the Company Commander and 
receive the following FRAGO: 
MISSION: 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st BN, XX BDE conducts a tactical foot march no later than (NLT)0300 
16 MAR XX along ROUTE BLUE in order to validate their readiness in preparation for assuming alert cycle 
responsibilities. 
METT-TC Analysis 
MISSION: Conduct a tactical foot march. 
ENEMY (Weather):The current temperature is 65 degrees Fahrenheit with low (20%) humidity. 
Conditions at your projected start time are 70 degrees with moderate to high (60%) humidity. At 
completion of the movement, temps will be in the low to mid 90's with high (80%) humidity. Cloud ceiling 
will be broken throughout the movement with a 0% chance of precipitation. 
TERRAIN: ROUTE BLUE is 25 miles (40.2 KMs) in length. It begins at Start Point (SP)1 and ends at Finish 
Point (FP)1. It is comprised of a road network consisting of unimproved (varying from sandy to hard-packed 
clay) roads traversing rolling to hilly terrain. The roads are generally bordered by wooded terrain. 
Vehicular traffic is expected to be light, consisting mainly of tactical vehicles. 
TROOPS: Squad Leader and above experience level is moderate within the PLT. Team Leader and below is 
moderate (see details below). All participants are healthy with no significant injuries. The PLT average on 
your last APFT was 260. Your PLT is only moderately rested as they were unaware of the upcoming EDRE 
and several chose to stay up late into the night. Their average amount of sleep is 5 hours. 
TIME: You have 2 hours to complete all phases of planning and BPT depart from SP 1. You have 10 hours 
to move from SP1 to the FP1. 
CIVILIANS: N/A 
ADDITIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS: 
• Your platoon represents an Airborne/Air Assault Modified Table of Organization & Equipment 
(MTOE) consisting of 3 x Rifle Squads, a Weapons Squad with 2 x machine guns teams, and a PLT 
HQ. The PLT HQ includes you, the PSG, a RATELO, and a Forward Observer. 
• You PLT Medic is not present but you have 1 x current and qualified Combat Life Saver (CLS) on 
hand. 
• You have 1 x 60 mm mortar team from the Co HQ attached to your PLT for the movement. You 
have not worked with this particular mortar team before. 
illllllllllll 
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Your PSG is a SFC who has been in his position for 18 months. 
One of you three Rifle Squad Leaders is a SSG with over one year leading his SQD. Your 2nd and 3rd 
SLs are SGTs. One grew up in the SQD and has recently replaced the previous SL. The other is 
new to the PLT having recently arrived from another unit. 
Your Weapons SQD Leader is a former Rifle SQD Leader and the most experienced SSG in the PLT. 
Your Team Leaders all CPLs or SGTs and have at least 6 months, but less than 1 year of experience 
in their positions. 
You have four newly-assigned Privates spread throughout the PLT who have not taken an APFT or 
executed any foot marches with the PLT. Two suffered minor heat injuries during Initial Entry 
Training (IET). 
You will have organic FM radio contact with the CO CP who can relay any necessary MEDEVAC 
requests to the BN Aid Station, where a Front Line Ambulance (FLA) and the BN Physician's 
Assistant (PA) are located. Aero Medevac is available upon request. 
You have no external water resupply available. 
The first half of the foot march will take place during hours of visibility. 
The average total individual load within the PLT is 70 lbs. 
3.2.2 Maintenance Scenario 
Scenario:  Conduct maintenance on your platoons M3 Bradleys 
SITUATION: One hour ago your platoon was notified that you will be moving your vehicles to the 
installation rail load site in preparation for deployment to JRTC. This movement was planned for six days 
from now but a change in rail stock availability has forced the early movement. Your company completed 
gunnery on Friday (two days ago) and worked on recovery operations through Saturday but the poor 
weather slowed completion of recovery operations and they are not yet complete. The battalion had the 
day off on Sunday. The time is now 0900 Monday 17 January and your Soldiers have just reported for 
delayed work call. Your platoon must complete recovery operations, prepare vehicles for movement and 
move to the rail load site NLT 2000 for a 2100 rail load time. 
METT-TC Analysis (Provided for your consideration) 
MISSION: See above. 
ENEMY: N/A. 
TERRAIN and WEATHER: The battalion motor pool is a hard stand site located 3 miles from the 
company area. The current road conditions are fair with some wetness due to rain fall over the weekend. 
The road to the rail load site is paved and generally flat but the Crooked Creek crossing has a steep decent 
and ascent after the bridge. The rail load site is located 6 miles from the motor pool. 
The current temperature is 26 degrees Fahrenheit with moderate (40%) humidity. The temperature is 
projected to fall throughout the day to a low of 5 degrees as a storm front moves into the area. The front is 
forecast to bring a wintery mix switching to snow by 1900. 
Traffic and civilian movement on post can be expected to increase throughout the day as the weather 
deteriorates. 
TROOPS: Squad Leader and above experience level is good within the PLT. Two squad leaders are very 
experienced but are new to the platoon within the last four months and have never served in a mechanized 
unit. The platoon sergeant has been called to a meeting by the battalion sergeant major and does not know 
when he will return. All participants are assumed healthy with no significant injuries. The PLT average on 
your last APFT was 225. Rest levels vary in the platoon depending on how the Soldiers spent their off hours 
after gunnery, 
mm 
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TIME: You have 11 hours to complete recovery, move to the rail load site and stage. This must be 
accomplished NLT 2000 IOT meet the 2100 rail load appointment. 
CIVILIANS:   N/A 
ADDITIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS: 
• Your platoon represents a mechanized infantry platoon with four operational M3 Bradleys. 
• Your company has a maintenance SOP but your platoon does not have a specific PLT level 
document. 
• The rail load SOP is from battalion level and has not been updated since return from the last 
deployment. 
• Your PSG is a SFC who has been in his position for 24 months. 
• Two squad leaders are experienced NCO's but have never served in a heavy unit. They just 
completed their first gunnery. The other two are experienced in their positions and have deployed 
in a heavy unit. 
• Your Team Leaders all CPLs or SGTs and have at least 6 months, but less than 1 year of experience 
in their positions. 
• You have eight newly-assigned Privates spread throughout the PLT who have not taken an APFT. 
• You have three identified prior cold weather injuries. 
3.3 Recruitment Strategy 
The RM worksheet data was collected from students attending IBOLC, the 
Army's initial training course for Infantry officers. The course teaches all of the tactical, 
technical, and legal information that officers need to perform their initial jobs in the 
Army. Prior to attending this course the officers have received training in many basic 
aspects of military operations at their commissioning source. 
The officers in this study were commissioned as second lieutenants from one of 
three sources. 
• United States Military Academy (USMA) - One of three service 
academies that the military uses to train junior officers. Students receive a 
four year college education and receive training in many basics of military 
art and science. Very few lieutenants commissioned through USMA have 
any prior service in the military. 
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• Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) - ROTC training takes place 
at the college that the student is attending. The training they receive 
usually consists of one college course per semester and additional after 
school labs focused on teaching specific Army tasks. ROTC cadets are 
evaluated for potential during the summer between their junior and senior 
years at the Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC). Some 
lieutenants commissioned through ROTC may have prior service in the 
military. 
• Officer Candidate School (OCS) - OCS is a means for enlisted Soldiers 
to transfer to the ranks of commissioned officers. The course is 12 weeks 
long and consists of a compressed training cycle of the officer centric 
skills that ROTC and USMA cadets received during their training. All 
lieutenants commissioned through OCS have some level of prior service in 
the military. 
The backgrounds of the officers vary significantly based on prior service in the 
military, commissioning source, personal history, and other biographical categories. Each 
of them has been trained in the RM process at some point, either at a prior military 
school, or commissioning source prior to the training received at IBOLC. These 
variations provide additional points of reference for determination of similarities or 
differences in their evaluations. All data collection and survey results have been handled 
in compliance with IRB requirements. 
Officers are assigned a course date at IBOLC based on graduation date from their 
commissioning source. Since USMA graduates are commissioned earlier than most other 
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officers, the course of lieutenants participating in this study had a higher than average 
number of USMA graduates. On arrival at the school, the students are divided into one of 
three groups, or platoons. The platoon that the officer is placed in is randomly selected by 
the school and is not based on any biographical or experiential information. Each platoon 
is led and trained by a different cadre of instructors that is made of up both officers and 
NCO's. Even though the trainers are different for each platoon, each cadre follows the 
same Program of Instruction (POI) for the courses instructed. 
The scenarios and all of the information required to complete them were provided 
to the participants along with a brief overview of the reasons for collecting their 
information. Each participant was told that participation was voluntary and a signed 
release was collected from each participant along with the completed RM worksheets. 
Participation from the students in the course was 73%. In total 72 correctly completed 
RM worksheets were collected and included in this research. 
3.4 Database Creation 
Each respondent's information was captured via a biographical questionnaire that 
was returned to the researcher along with the RM worksheets. Data for each participant 
was collected and entered into biographical categories in the database. The categories that 
were evaluated were: 
1. Platoon - The officers in the course were broken down into subgroups by 
platoon. Each officer was either in First, Second, or Third platoon. 
2. Commissioning Source - Each officer received their commission in the army 
from one of three sources, Military Service Academy, Reserve Officers Training Corp 
(ROTC), or Officers Candidate School (OCS). 
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3. Prior Service - This category is based on whether the officer in question has 
ever served in the US Military in another capacity. Category is coded as Yes or No 
4. Time in Service - categorized as less than 1 year, greater than 1 but less than 3 
years, or greater than 3 years. 
5. Component - This category is based on the component of service for the 
Soldier. Any officer that has no prior service is considered in the Active Duty category. 
Prior service officers can either be Active Duty, or Reserve Component based on which 
component they previously served in. 
6. Major - This category was determined based on the collegiate major of the 
officer. Major was broken down into the five sub-categories listed in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Subcategories of biographical category Major 
SUB-CATEGORY INCLUDES MAJORS IN 
Physical Science Biology, Chemistry, Exercise Science, Geoscience 
Social Science Political Science, Psychology, Criminal Justice, 
Sociology, Languages, Law, Defense and Strategic 
Studies, Foreign Studies 
Business Business, Economics, Culinary Management 
Math,          Technology          and 
Engineering 
Engineering, Computer Science, Operational 
Research 
History History, Geography, Philosophy 
7. Deployments - This category is the total number of deployments of the 
specified officer. From this respondent list the deployments range from 0 to 3. 
Inputs from the survey respondents were coded into categories based on the Army 
standard evaluation areas of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil 
Consideration (METT-TC). The categories Mission, Terrain, Troops, and Time were 
used in the evaluation of the collected data. These four categories were further broken 
down into the sub-categories listed in Table 2. 
HBimiimmiffl 
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Table 2 
Army evaluation criteria for METT-TC 
Category Sub-Category 
Mission C2 Span of Control SOP Dissemination 
Terrain Temp/Weather Route Illumination Traffic 
Troops 
Platoon Task 
Experience 
Physical Condition 
of Soldiers and 
Equip 
Leader 
Experience 
Key Personnel 
Availability 
Time Planning Time Time to Complete Mission 
3.5 Coding 
The RM worksheets received from the participants were reviewed and the hazards 
identified in them were coded for inclusion into one of the 12 sub-categories. The 
specific wording of each identified hazard was evaluated and the most appropriate 
category was determined. Many of the hazards were identified by the participants in such 
a way that the definition of the sub-category was included. Hazards that included this 
wording were moved into that sub-category since they did not require any additional 
processing. Each sub-category is discussed in Tables 3-6 along with the definition for the 
category and any keywords that were coded into the category that were not included in 
the definition. Keyword columns that are blank did not have any hazards identified that 
did not include part of the definition in their identification. 
Table 3 
Sub-Categories, definitions, and keywords for Mission 
Sub-Category Definition Keywords 
C2 Span of Control Difficulty related to controlling 
the overall mission related to the 
size   and   number   of  units   or 
personnel 
Lost Soldier/fallout 
SOP Dissemination Level    of   understanding    and 
dissemination       of      standing 
operating procedures 
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Table 4 
Sub-Categories, definitions, and keyivords for Terrain 
Sub-Category Definition Keywords 
Temperature / Weather Environment that the mission is 
conducted in 
Climate, Heat, Cold, 
Route Any hazards related to the route, 
or road trafficability 
Surface traction, Ascent/Decent, 
Road   width,   Vehicle   rollover, 
Eye      injury,      Snowy      road, 
Collisions 
Illumination Visibility related to light level Limited visibility 
Traffic Other traffic in the area, related 
to vehicles not involved in the 
mission 
Table 5 
Sub-Categories, definitions, and keywords for Troops 
Sub-Category Definition Keywords 
Platoon Task Experience Level of experience of either the 
individuals or collective unit on 
tasks involved in the mission 
Inexperienced privates, Vehicle 
injuries (not traffic related), 
Soldiers run over by Bradley, 
Rail load equipment, Vehicle 
damage from loading, Motorpool 
mvt, Spills during fueling 
Physical  Condition  of Soldiers 
and equipment 
Any hazard or issue related to 
the      physical      abilities      or 
condition      of     the      Soldiers 
involved in the mission 
Heat / Cold casualties, 
Dehydration, Blisters, Fatigue, 
Sleep deprivation, Previous heat 
injuries, Heavy load / equipment, 
Low APFT average 
Leader Experience Experience       of       leadership 
involved      in      planning      or 
executing the mission 
Key personnel availability Availability or absence of key 
personnel   or   leaders   for   the 
planning   or   execution   of  the 
mission 
Table 6 
Sub-Categories, definitions, and keywords for Time 
Sub-Category Definition Keywords 
Planning Time Available Time available for planning 
Time to Complete Mission Time required to complete the 
mision 
3.6 Hazard Value Assignment 
The RM worksheet correlates each hazard identified to a risk value (L, M, H, EH). 
The risk value of each identified hazard was taken from the RM worksheet and entered 
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into the database. When multiple hazards were identified in the same category all of them 
were captured and added to the database. The values for input into the expert system were 
developed   based   on   the   Army   Risk   Assessment   Matrix   shown   in   Figure   2. 
RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
MATRIX 
HAZARD PROBABILITY 
Frequent Likely Occasional 
Catastrophic 
Critical 
Moderate 
Negligible 
Seldom 
D 
High 
fv 
Moderate 
Unlikely 
Low 
Figure 2. Army Risk Assessment Matrix [30] 
Each risk value was calculated as a percentage of the total value represented in the 
matrix. For example, the risk value EH holds three of the total 20 positions in the matrix 
therefore its value is 15%. A ten position linear scale from 0 (lowest risk) to 1 (highest 
risk) was used and each risk value was calculated based on the percentage of the scale 
occupied by that risk value. The start and end point of the value was calculated and 
averaged to develop the scale value each level of risk. Since EH holds 15% of the scale 
its scale value was calculated at .925. Table 7 shows the values that were identified for 
each hazard scale value. 
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Table 7 
Scale values calculation for identified hazards 
Hazard Value Percentage           of 
Scale 
Scale Range Scale Value 
Low 35 0 - .3499 .175 
Moderate 25 .350 - .5999 .475 
High 25 .600 - .8499 .725 
Extremely High 15 .850-1 .925 
When multiple hazards were identified in a single hazard category, the value of each 
was calculated in the following manner. The hazard with the highest scale value was 
calculated at full scale value, the second hazard was calculated by a factor of .5, the third 
value was calculated by a factor of .25, and the fourth was calculated at .125. These 
values were added together making the total cumulative for that subcategory cumulative. 
This decreasing valuation was implemented to ensure that each hazard in a unique 
subcategory was treated with more significance than multiple hazards in a single 
subcategory. The rational for this decision was that a leader who has identified one 
hazard in a subcategory is more likely to focus mitigation efforts on that category and 
identification of subsequent hazards for the same subcategory yielded a lower overall risk 
reduction than identification of a hazard in another category. Table 8 provides an 
example of this methodology. 
Table 8 
Coding example for multiple hazards 
Hazards Scale Values Total Value 
1M, 1M, 1L .475, .238, .044 .757 
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Table 9 represents the data provided by one respondent for one scenario. The top 
shaded area shows the number and severity of hazards identified for each sub-section. 
Sub categories that are blank did not have a hazard identified by this respondent. The 
bottom shaded area shows the data after it has been converted to a numerical value based 
on the number and severity of the identified hazards. 
Table 9 
Hazard value conversions for one data record 
Mission Terrain Troops Time 
C2 
SOP 
Dis Temp Route Ilium Traffic 
PLT 
Exp 
Phy 
Cond 
Kdr 
Exp 
Key 
Pax Planning Complete 
1,M 
l.M 
KM KM KH KH KM KM 
KM KM 
KM KM 
0.475 0.713 0.475 0.726 0.73 0.475 0.475 0.772 0.475 
3.7 Fuzzy Expert System 
In [12] the authors conduct research with a fuzzy neural network that is similar in 
concept to the system developed for the purpose of this study but is used for a different 
purpose [12]. In their research they evaluate risk for specific IT systems based on natural 
language inputs from assessments made by the company. This research does not look at 
the human factors involved, but their system does inform the development of this system. 
The architecture for the fuzzy expert system used in this study is represented in 
Figure 3. MATLAB version R2012a was used to implement this system and an overview 
of it is shown in Figure 4. Existing research in RM is primarily conducted via data 
mining utilizing a neural network. A neural network was determined not to be the most 
effective method to evaluate the data collected for this thesis since it cannot process 
records with significant missing data and is not tolerant of natural language. 
inoiinm 
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Figure 3. Fuzzy Expert System 
The developed expert system uses trapezoidal membership functions, a Mamdani 
style fuzzy inferencing system (FIS) and a centroid defuzzification method to produce a 
crisp output as shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 displays the membership function for Span of 
Control within the Mission category of hazards. The Mamdani FIS evaluates each of the 
natural language inputs and determines its level within the membership function. Once 
each of the inputs has been evaluated within the membership functions, the rules 
(described below) are followed and the rule antecedent is applied. This results in a crisp 
numerical output for each hazard category. 
Figure 4. Architecture of Fuzzy Bxpert System 
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Figure 5. Span of Control membership function 
MATLAB was selected for to build the fuzzy expert system since it allows for 
multiple output variables to be calculated from one set of input variables. The ability to 
combine what is essentially four separate fuzzy expert systems into one saved a 
significant amount of time in the creation of the fuzzy expert system. In this 
implementation each hazard category (Mission, Terrain, Troops, Time) receives its own 
value from the common set of input variables. 
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3.7.7 Rule Development 
Inputs from the survey respondents were coded into categories based on the Army 
standard   evaluation   tool   of Mission,   Enemy,   Terrain,   Troops,   Time,   and   Civil 
Consideration (METT-TC). The categories Mission, Terrain, Troops, and Time were 
used in the evaluation of the collected data. The fuzzy inferencing system (FIS) provides 
crisp outputs for each hazard category and an overall value for each category. The rules 
were created in such a way as to model the inter-related nature of the hazards from the 
various categories. The fuzzy expert system developed for this study consisted of 544 
rules. Due to the complex hazard relationships in any scenario it is insufficient to simply 
provide a "hazard total" based on the hazards identified. The fuzzy expert system allows 
this system to be modeled and a crisp number to be achieved for each hazard category 
that can then be evaluated for relationships with other respondents samples. A sample of 
rules from the expert system are shown in Figure 6. 
If (C2 is Low| and (50P_Dissernination is Low) then (Mission is Low} 
If (C2 is Moderate} and (SOP_Dissemmation is Low) then (Mission is Moderate) 
If (C2 is Moderate! and (SOP_Dissemination is Moderate) then (Mission is Moderate) 
If (C2 is High) and (SOP_Dissemination is Low) then (Mission is High) 
If (Temp is Moderate) and (Route is Low) and (Illumination is Low) and (Traffic is Low) then (Terrain is Moderate) 
If (Temp is Low) and (Route is Moderate) and (Illumination is Low) and (Traffic is Low) then (Terrain is Moderate) 
If (Temp is High) and (Route is Moderate) and (Illumination is Moderate) and (Traffic is Low) then (Terrain is Extremely High) 
If (Temp is Extremely High) and (Route is Moderate) and (Illumination is Low) and (Traffic is Low) then (Terrain is Extremely High) 
If (Plt_Exp is Low) and (Physical_Cond is Low) and (Ldr_Exp is Moderate) and (Key_Pax_Avail is Low) then (Troops is Low) 
If (Plt_Exp is Moderate) and (Physical_Cond is Low) and (Ldr_Exp is Moderate! and (Key_Pax_Avail is Low) then (Troops is High) 
If (Plt_Exp is High) and (Physical_Cond is Moderate) and (Ldr_Exp is Moderate) and (Key_Pax_Avail is Low) then (Troops is Extremely High) 
If (Plt_Exp is High) and (Physical_Cond is High) and (Ldr_Exp is Moderate) and (Key_Pax_Avail is Low) then (Troops is Extremely High) 
If (Plannmg_Time is Low) and (Time_To_Complete is Low) then (Time is Extremely Low) 
If (Plannmg_Time is Moderate) and (Time_To_Complete is Low) then (Time is Extremely Moderate) 
If (Planning_Time is Moderate) and (Time_To_Complete is Moderate) then (Time is High) 
If (Planning_Time is High) and (Time_To_Complete is High! then (Time is Extremely High) 
Figure 6. Sample rules from fuzzy expert system 
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The output from the fuzzy expert system shown in Figure 7 for the data records in 
Table 9 is set of crisp numbers representing the four output fuzzy variables in this case 
[.716,.895,.895,.18]. These numbers were captured and added to the database as values or 
their respective data record. The database was then input into SPSS for the data 
evaluation using clustering techniques. 
Uswsv™- M™fe» >■» 
Figure 7. Hazard Value Output from MATLAB 
3.8 Data Evaluation 
Evaluation of the data collected from the fuzzy expert system was conducted in 
IBM SPSS Statistics version 21. SPSS is a powerful software package that allows users 
to conduct a wide variety of statistical analysis on data sets. The software permits data to 
be manipulated and then tested and reviewed for significance. The Two-Step clustering 
tool was used for this study. 
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The SPSS Two-Step clustering component is a cluster analysis tool designed to 
handle large databases [31]. The process involves pre-clustering and final clustering in 
one step and is designed to handle continuous and categorical variables. During the first 
step, SPSS calculates the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for each number of 
clusters in a specified range to find the initial estimate for the number of clusters. In the 
second step it refines the estimate by determining the greatest change in distance between 
the two closest clusters in each clustering stage [31]. SPSS allows the user to either select 
the final number of clusters that they would like to have presented or allow the system to 
identify the number based on a user selected maximum. 
The data records were entered into SPSS and then evaluated with the two-step 
clustering tool to determine which study participants fell into the same cluster. The 
clusters were evaluated based on the previously determined biographical categories in 
order to determine the most significant variables attached to each cluster. These 
independent variables (the biographical data) were then compared to the dependent 
variables (Mission, Terrain, Troops, Time) with a one way ANOVA test to determine 
which hazard categories held statistical significance. The results from the two scenarios 
were then compared to determine which biographical attributes provide the most 
significant impact on how the respondents identify hazards. 
4. Results 
The collected data has been analyzed using Two-Step clustering and ANOVA 
statistical tests in SPSS statistical software. The Two-Step clustering process was 
conducted with the dependent variables Mission, Terrain, Troops, and Time (hazard 
categories) to create the clusters. The clusters were then evaluated on the independent 
variables Platoon, Major, AC/RC, Commissioning source, Prior service, Time in service, 
and Deployment. An additional variable for the data records was created that is the 
cluster number that the record was assigned to. The cluster number variable was 
evaluated with the one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. Different numbers of 
clusters were experimented with and classifying the data into five clusters produced the 
best overall results. The clusters for both scenarios were categorized as "good" by the 
clustering tool as shown in Figure 8 for the Foot March scenario and Figure 9 for the 
Maintenance scenario. This indicates that the overall model quality used to produce the 
clusters was good and the clusters themselves are significant. Statistical significance for 
this study is determined as any significance factor of .05 or less. 
Figure 8. Model Summary for Foot March Scenario 
Figure 9. Model Summary for Maintenance Scenario 
■If 
31 
Model Summary 
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Inputs 4 
Clusters 5 
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4.1 Foot March Scenario Results 
For the Foot March scenario, Figure 10 shows the independent variables in order 
of significance as predictors of cluster membership. According to these clusters, Platoon 
is the most significant followed by Major and AC/RC. 
MMH 
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Platoon 
Num_Major 
AC  RC  Num 
3rior SVC Num 
Com  S Num 
TIS  NUM 
Deployments 
Figure 10. Independent Variable Significance for Foot March Scenario 
An ANOVA was calculated on respondent's ratings of the dependent variables 
Mission, Terrain, Troops and Time based on the independent variable Platoon. There was 
a significant effect of Platoon (IV) on Mission (DV) at the p<.05 level for the three 
platoons [F(2, 69) = 3.16,/? = .049], and there was a significant effect of Platoon (IV) on 
Terrain (DV) at the p<05 level for the three platoons, [F(2, 69) = 4.40, p = .016]. 
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Table 10 
A NOVA test results for independent variable Platoon in Foot March scenario 
ANOVA 
33 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Mission Between Groups 
.123 2 .062 3.156 .049 
Within Groups 1 347 69 .020 
Total 1 470 71 
Terrain Between Groups 216 *-v .108 4.406 ,016 
Within Groups 1 692 69 .025 
Total 1 908 71 
Troops Between Groups 223 M .112 2.185 .120 
Within Groups 3 524 69 .051 
Total 3 747 71 
Time Between Groups 000 **> .000 .000 1.000 
Within Groups 000 69 .000 
Total 000 71 
Post hoc comparisons for Mission using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
mean score for the 1st Platoon lieutenants (M = .287, SD = .191) was significantly 
different than the 3rd Platoon lieutenants (M = .180, SD = 0). However, the 2nd Platoon 
lieutenants (M = .218, SD = .129) did not significantly differ from the 1st Platoon and 3rd 
Platoon lieutenants. 
Post hoc comparisons using for Terrain the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
mean score for the 3rd Platoon lieutenants (M = .655, SD = .217) was significantly 
different than the 1st Platoon lieutenants (M = .783, SD = .125), and 2nd Platoon 
lieutenants (M = .784, SD = .139). However results did not significantly differ from the 
1st Platoon and 2nd Platoon lieutenants. The Tukey HSD test for Platoon is shown in 
Table 11. 
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Table 11 
Tukey HSD lest results for independent variable Platoon in Fool March scenario 
Multiple Comparisons 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent variable     fl) Platoon     OS Platoon 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) Std. Error Sig 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Mission                       1                   2 
3 
.068546 
106417* 
.037991 
.044294 
.176 
,049 
-.02245 
.00032 
.15955 
21 252 
:              1 
3 
-.068546 
.037871 
.037991 
.042170 
.176 
.643 
-.1 5955 
-.06314 
.02245 
.13888 
3                     1 
-106417 
-.037871 
.044294 
,042170 
,049 
.643 
"... I £3« 
-,13888 
-.00032 
.06314 
Terrain                        1                   2 
3 
-.000778 
.128537" 
.042571 
.049634 
1.000 
.031 
-.10275 
.00965 
.10119 
.24743 
2                   1 
3 
.000778 
.129315* 
.042571 
,047253 
1.000 
,021 
-.10119 
.01613 
.10275 
.24250 
3                   1 
5 
-.128537 
-.129315* 
.049634 
.047253 
,031 
.021 
-.24743 
-24250 
-.00965 
-.01613 
Troops                        1                   2 
3 
.071636 
.149194 
.061447 
.071642 
.477 
.101 
-.07555 
-.02241 
.21882 
.32080 
2                   1 
3 
-.071636 
.077558 
.061447 
.068205 
,477 
.495 
-.21882 
-.08582 
.07555 
.24093 
3                   1 
5 
-.149194 
-.077558 
.071642 
.068205 
,101 
.495 
-.32080 
-.24093 
.02241 
.08582 
Time                           1                   2 
3 
.000000 
oooooo' 
.000000 
.000000 
,000 
,023 
.00000 
.00000 
.00000 
00000 
2                   1 
3 
.000000 
.oooooo" 
.000000 
.000000 
.000 
000 
.00000 
.00000 
00000 
.00000 
3                   1 
.000000 
oooooo' 
oooooo 
oooooo 
.023 
.000 
.00000 
.00000 
.00000 
00000 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
The independent variables Major and AC/RC are listed as the second and third 
most significant indicators of cluster membership. Neither of these variables approached 
statistical significance when compared against any of the dependent variables with the 
ANOVA test as shown in Tables 12 and 13. These results indicate that while the two 
variables did contribute to the cluster formation they did so at a low enough level that 
they are not significant to this study. 
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Table 12 
ANOVA test results for independent variable Major in Foot March scenario 
ANOVA 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Mission Between Groups 134 4 .033 1.678 .165 
Within Groups 1.336 67 .020 
Total 1.470 71 
Terrain Between Groups 
.031 4 .008 .277 .892 
Within Groups 1.S76 67 028 
Total 1.808 71 
Troops Between Groups 
.079 4 .020 .359 .837 
Within Groups 3.669 67 .055 
Total 3.747 71 
Time Between Groups 
.000 4 000 .000 1.000 
Within Groups 
.000 67 .000 
Total 
.000 71 
Table 13 
ANOVA test results for independent variable AC.'RC in Foot March scenario 
ANOVA 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Mission Between Groups 
.006 1 .006 .276 .601 
Within Groups 1 465 70 .021 
Total 1 470 71 
Terrain Between Groups 002 1 .002 .084 .773 
Within Groups 1 905 70 .027 
Total 1 908 71 
Troops Between Groups 128 1 .128 2.477 .120 
Within Groups 3 619 70 .052 
Total 3 747 71 
Time Between Groups 000 1 .000 .000 1.000 
Within Groups 
.000 70 .000 
Total 
.000 71 
No other independent variables showed statistically significant results when 
compared to the dependent variables. None of the respondents found any hazards 
associated with the variable Time in the Foot March scenario. The manner in which the 
mmm mmmm 
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scenario was presented did not stress time as a significant factor. This resulted in each 
officer having an identical hazard value for the category so there was no statistics data 
available for this variable from the Foot March scenario. 
4.2 Maintenance Scenario Results 
For the Maintenance scenario Prior Service is the most important predictor of 
cluster membership followed by Platoon and Time in Service as shown in Figure 11. 
Prior_SVC_Num 
Platoon 
TIS_NUM 
AC_RC_Num 
NumMajor 
Com  S  Num 
 1  
0.0 0.2 0.4 
Figure 11. Independent Variable Significance for Maintenance Scenario 
—P 
0.6 
There were no statistically significant independent variables for the Maintenance 
scenario. Table 14 shows that even though Prior Service was identified as the most 
significant predictor of cluster membership it failed to reach the level of statistical 
significance in any hazard category. 
mm 
Table 14 
ANOVA test results for independent variable Prior Service in Maintenance 
ANOVA 
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Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Mission_2 Between Groups 
.011 1 .011 622 .433 
Within Groups 1 183 70 .017 
Total 1 194 71 
Terra in_2 Between Groups 017 1 .017 .464 .498 
Within Groups 2 613 70 .037 
Total 3 630 71 
Troops_2 Between Groups 035 1 .035 .545 .483 
Within Groups 4 554 70 .065 
Total 4 589 71 
Time_2 Between Groups 024 1 .024 1.889 .173 
Within Groups 675 70 .012 
Total 898 71 
mem 
5. Analysis 
The statistical tests conducted for this study showed mixed results. There were no 
clear statistically significant results in the overall hazard categories based on the seven 
independent variables (biographical information). The two-step clustering process did 
show that there were independent variables that were predictors of cluster membership. 
The ANOVA test demonstrated that there were statistically significant results for 
individual hazard categories based on one of the independent variables, and post hoc 
testing with the Tukey test showed that the categories within the variable Platoon were 
significant to each other. A more detailed analysis of these results is provided below. 
This, in addition to the overall good quality rating of the clusters in SPSS, 
indicates that Mission, Terrain, and Troops were significant in the formation of the 
clusters for the Foot March scenario. Since there were no hazards identified by the 
participants in the Time category, this category made not contribution to the cluster 
formation. These values show that there is a variation in how the hazards in the first three 
categories were identified by respondents assigned to different clusters and indicate 
further examination based on the other independent variables. 
The cluster results from the Foot March scenario indicated that Platoon was the 
most significant indicator of which cluster the respondents data record would be assigned 
to. Platoon demonstrated statistical significance for the dependent variables Mission 
(p=049) and strong statistical significance for the dependent variable Terrain (p=.016). 
These results indicate that there may be a correlation between the instruction provided to 
the officers in the three different groups and the level of severity that they identified for 
hazards in the scenario. This is plausible since even though the same instruction materials 
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are used for the RM training blocks, each student is instructed by the cadre for their 
assigned platoon. Due to the nature of the subject matter, each instructor would likely 
draw on their background and experience and likely place greater emphasis on different 
parts of the instruction. 
The independent variable Prior Service showed no statistical significance in the 
Foot March scenario. This result is surprising since officers who had prior service 
experience should have viewed the hazards associated with the scenarios through a 
significantly different experiential lens than those who did not. The lack of a correlation 
between prior service and assignment of hazard severity may have been a result of the 
population of prior service officers in the data sample. 17 of the 72, or 24%, officers in 
the data sample were prior service and they were distributed across the three platoons. At 
24% the sample size should have been large enough to show up as statistically significant 
unless there were other factors such as a masking effect from the variable Platoon. 
The variable Deployments also showed no level of statistical significance for the 
dependent variables. Due to the very small sample size, generalizations cannot be made 
from this result. Out of the sample 72 records, only five, or 7%, had prior deployments. A 
much larger sample of leaders with deployment experience would be required to 
determine any statistical significance to this relationship. 
In the Maintenance scenario, cluster quality was also rated as good indicating that 
the four dependent variables Mission, Terrain, Troops, and Time were significant in the 
cluster formation. Time was identified as a factor in this scenario and hazards were 
identified by many of the respondents. Prior Service, Platoon, and Time in Service were 
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the   three   most   significant   predictors   of  cluster   membership   but   none   of them 
demonstrated statistical significance in relation to any of the independent variables. 
The fact that Prior Service was the most significant indicator of cluster 
membership was expected but the fact that it was not significant for any of the dependent 
variables was surprising. Since scenario two was vehicle based and included tasks 
directly related to vehicle training operations, Prior Service, AC/RC, and other 
experiential based independent variables were expected to show significant. Many of the 
tasks included in the Maintenance scenario would not be common to the experience of an 
officer that has not served in the military prior to commissioning. This could indicate that 
the hazards presented in the scenario were not unique enough to prior service officers or 
that the much higher percentage of non-prior service officers in the study created a 
swamping effect for the variable. 
The lack of results based on Commissioning Source was also surprising. The 
training received between the three commissioning sources varies significantly and in 
both scenarios Commissioning Source was one of the least significant variables for 
cluster membership prediction. The lack of significance based on commissioning source 
may be a positive for the Army. The fact that Commissioning Source showed no 
significance for cluster membership could mean that the training received at each 
commissioning source is similar enough in value that it produces a common view on 
hazards and risk. This result should be explored for validation with further research. 
It is not possible to draw definitive conclusions for the results of the two scenarios 
due to the lack of commonality of statistically significant results between them. The most 
evident correlation is that the hazard categories Mission. Terrain and Troops were 
41 
significant in cluster formation for both scenarios. This provides an indication that the 
respondent's background has a more significant impact on the hazards they assessed in 
these categories but the lack of broader statistically significant results prevents drawing 
this as a definitive conclusion. 
The variable Platoon did show a correlation among the two scenarios being the 
most significant predictor of cluster membership in the Foot March scenario and the 
second most significant predictor in the Maintenance scenario. The fact that it was only 
statistically significant in relation to two dependent variables in the Foot March scenario 
and not statistically significant in the Maintenance scenario prevents generalization 
regarding the significance of the training received by the respondents and its impact on 
their hazard assessments. The correlation of Platoon among the two scenarios does point 
to training as an area worthy of further study. 
6. Conclusion 
Research in the field of RM is extensive and covers a wide breadth and depth of 
aspects of the topic but the evaluation of RM in the US Army is limited. Works like [3] 
and [4] discuss the process of Army RM but did not look at the individuals making inputs 
into the process, only the process itself. Works by [5], [6], and [7] explore RM as a 
decision making tool and the value it provides to leader. RM use in the civilian sector is 
discussed in [8] and [9], particularly how it relates to forecasting in insurance. The 
authors of [10], [11], and [12] use expert systems or neural networks to evaluate RM in 
sectors like logistics and IT. [15], and [16] discuss ERM and from these works the 
similarities between ERM and military RM are described. [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], and 
[25], discuss risk from the perspective of the individual and the impact that personality 
factors may have on an individual's view of risk. 
The work done in this thesis extends the application of fuzzy expert systems to the 
domain of RM in the US Army. The two-step clustering technique was used to identify 
clusters of similar behavior which were then analyzed using One-Way Anova statistical 
test. The results of this study did not show clear, statistically significant correlations 
between how various individuals view risk, however they did provide some insight into 
certain training and background characteristics that may be influential to an individual's 
hazard assessments. For example, having Platoon as a significant predictor in the clusters 
formation may indicate that the most recent training received applies in a more 
significant manner than previous training (Commissioning Source) or experience (Prior 
Service). The study also demonstrated that the tools and techniques used for processing 
and evaluating data seem to be valid for use in this domain. 
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6.1 Limitations 
One of the limitations to the study that prevents generalization is the relatively 
homogeneous nature of the data sample. The survey respondents for this study came from 
a single class of second lieutenants at a single point during their training. 48 of the 72, or 
66%, of the officers surveyed were commissioned from US Military Academies. This is a 
significantly higher percentage than the total number of lieutenants commissioned into 
the Army by USMA which was 17.8% in 2005 [32]. Another side effect of the high 
percentage of USMA officers in the study is that it reduces the number of prior service 
officers in the study below normal levels since very few USMA cadets have prior service 
in the military. The smaller population of prior service officers also reduces the number 
of previously deployed officers in the study, only five respondents in the study have 
served an operational deployment. This small number removes Deployments as a valid 
variable even though it would be considered a major background indicator of hazard 
assessment. 
Another limitation in this study is that as a commissioning source, OCS was 
underrepresented in the study. Nine of the 72 respondents, or 12.5%, listed OCS as their 
commissioning source, in 2005 OCS provided 25% of commissioned lieutenants not 
entering a specialty branch as a direct commission [32]. As a commissioning source it 
would be expected to provide a significant number of previously deployed officers since 
all of the lieutenants commissioned through OCS have prior service. In this study three of 
the five officers with operational deployments came from OCS. 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
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While these limitations do prevent generalization from this study they do provide 
clarification for the direction of future work. Future work in the field could follow three 
paths. One is expanding the current research to include a larger pool of officers of 
different ranks and backgrounds. Since the officers in this study were all from the 
infantry branch it is not possible to generalize to lieutenants of different branches. Future 
work should be expanded both vertically, to include officers of higher ranks, and 
horizontally to include lieutenants with different branches. Research can also be 
expanded to include enlisted ranks since there are approximately 4.5 enlisted Soldiers per 
officer in the Army [33] this study would vastly increase the population available for 
study. Studies expanded in this manner would allow generalization across the force and 
could lead to more significant assessments on which experiences have the greatest 
influence on hazard assessment. Previous work in [34] indicates that rank and time in 
service are indicators of risk perception. 
The second method of research expansion would be pre and post testing of 
IBOLC lieutenants. Respondents could be surveyed at their initial arrival to IBOLC and 
then again at the end of the course and have their results compared. This research study 
would test the effect of the variables Platoon, which is tied to instruction received in the 
IBOLC coursework, and Commissioning source, which would be tied to training received 
prior to commissioning. 
The third possible path of study is to conduct the study on a similar population of 
IBOLC officers again to confirm results. If similar results are achieved then the study 
could be expanded to basic officer courses in other branches to see if the results can be 
generalized to second lieutenants. The results from several branches could be tested 
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against each other for statistical significance to determine if there are similarities or 
differences between the risk perceptions of the officers. 
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